Anup Agrawal

Specialty Areas:

Corporate Finance and Investments, Corporate Control and Governance, Executive Compensation, Insider Trading, Corporate Fraud, Security Analysts, Market Efficiency

Education:

University of Bombay (B. Comm.), Xavier Institute, Jamshedpur (M.B.A.), University of Pittsburgh (Ph.D.).

Honors, Achievements and Affiliations:

Dr. Agrawal has published ten papers in the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Business, and Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; four papers in the Journal of Law and Economics; and published in Economic Theory, Financial Management, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of International Money and Finance. He has presented his research at seminars and conferences around the world. His research has received over 1,800 citations in academic papers and textbooks. He is ranked among the top one percent of all authors on the Social Science Research Network. His research has also been the subject of feature stories in Financial Times Deutschland and Wall Street Journal Online. He has been a visiting faculty member at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Agrawal is a member of the Editorial Boards of the Journal of Corporate Finance, the Journal of Financial Research and four other academic journals. He is a Director of the Financial Management Association during 2009-2011, and co-chaired the Corporate Finance Track at the 2004 FMA annual meeting. Before coming to academia, he worked for two years with an international management consulting firm.

Publications

• Do Analyst Conflicts Matter: Evidence from Stock Recommendations. Journal of Law and Economics. (With M. Chen.) August 2008.

• Contests to Become CEO: Incentives, Selection and Handicaps. Economic Theory. (With F. Tsoulouhas and C. Knoeber) February 2007.

• Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules. ?Journal of Business. (With S. Chadha and M. Chen) November 2006.

• Are Outsiders Handicapped in CEO Successions? Journal of Corporate Finance. (With C. Knoeber and F. Tsoulouhas.) June 2006.

• Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals. Journal of Law and Economics. (With S. Chadha.) October 2005.

• Do Takeover Targets Under-perform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. (With J. Jaffe.) December 2003.

• Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role? Journal of Law and Economics. (With C. Knoeber.) April 2001.

• Management Turnover and Corporate Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud. Journal of Law and Economics. (With J. Jaffe and J. Karpoff.) April 1999.

• Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover. Journal of Financial Economics. (With C. Knoeber.) February 1998.

• Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. (With C. Knoeber.) September 1996.

• Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers? Journal of Financial Economics. (With J. Jaffe.) October-November 1995.

• Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids. The Journal of Finance. (With R. Walkling.) July 1994.

• Anomalies or Illusions? Evidence from Stock Markets in Nineteen Countries. The Journal of International Money and Finance. (With K. Tandon.) February 1994.

• The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly. The Journal of Finance. (With J. Jaffe and G.N. Mandelker.) September 1992.

• Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms. The Journal of Finance. (With N.J. Nagarajan.) September 1990.

• Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. (With G.N. Madelker.) June 1990.

• Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions. The Journal of Finance. (With G.N. Madelker.) September 1987.